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Abstract 
It has been argued that transaction trust is composed of party trust and control trust. In 
this paper we study control trust: trust in an institution that has set up a control 
mechanism. We present an account of control mechanisms using normative multiagent 
systems. Control mechanisms consist of constitutive norms which define evidential 
documents, and regulative norms which define violation conditions and sanctions. The 
account is illustrated by an analysis of the Letter of Credit trade procedure. 
1. Introduction 
Trust is an important concept in electronic commerce. When a transaction has to be 
arranged over a long distance by individuals that do not know each other, and do not 
share a social or cultural background, lack of trust is likely. We are interested in this 
notion of transaction trust. Suppose individual a, the trustor, is about to engage in a 
transaction with individual b, the trustee. The success of the transaction for a crucially 
depends on the behavior of b, but a is not in a position to monitor or control b's behavior. 
Because a is vulnerable to the actions of b, a's decision to engage in the transaction 
depends on his level of trust ( Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995).  
In general, transaction trust can be based on a personal relationship, on the social role that 
the other party is playing in some institution, on personal past experiences, or on a 
reputation, which is based on past experiences of other trusted parties. Such reasons for 
trusting the other party are called party trust. In the absence of direct reasons for trusting 
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the other party, a trustor may turn to institutions that enforce control mechanisms. Think 
of an escrow service, or a quality standard maintained by an international standards body. 
The mere presence of a control mechanism is not enough. The trustor must understand 
how the mechanism works, and must have trust in the institution that enforces it. This is 
called control trust. The general idea can be summarized as follows ( Tan and Thoen 
2000, Tan and Thoen 2002).  
Transaction Trust = Party Trust + Control Trust 
Regarding party trust, a lot of research effort has gone into on-line reputation 
mechanisms, and methods for learning people's trustworthiness on the basis of past 
experiences, e.g. ( Macy and Skvoretz 1998, Castelfranchi and Tan 2000). Much less 
attention has been paid to control trust. However, we believe that this factor is as 
important as the other factors in predicting transaction trust.  
In this paper we will have a look at the way an individual understands a control 
mechanism, and how this affects the decision to trust another party. Thus we have the 
following two research questions.  
1. How can we model control trust?  
2. How does control trust affect transaction trust?  
The research method is to make a model of the relevant aspects of the individual's 
decision making process, and use a logic to represent the model. In general such logical 
models can be used for simulation and analysis, or can be implemented directly in an 
intelligent trust management system. An example of the latter kind of model is found in 
declarative policy languages for access control ( Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Lacy 1996). Our 
model is intended for purposes of analysis and simulation.  
The particular type of model we use in this paper is that of a normative multiagent system 
(NMAS). Normative multiagent systems are  
"sets of agents (human or artificial) whose interactions can fruitfully be regarded 
as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should 
not behave. (...) Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that actual 
behavior may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of obligations, 
or of agents’ rights, may occur" ( Jones and Carmo 2002).  
We will use the version of NMAS developed by Boella et al. (2004; 2005). In particular, 
we apply the possibility of recursive modeling that is afforded by multiagent systems: 
based on a profile of other agents, an agent can simulate several scenario's, and select an 
appropriate decision on the basis of those simulations. A profile is nothing but a set of 
expectations. This reflects the fact that we treat trust as an epistemic notion. So in our 
account, the amount of trust is based on the information agents have about other agents.  
Control mechanisms are modeled here by a collection of constitutive and regulative rules. 
Constitutive rules define the institutional concepts. They are modeled here as generic 
beliefs. Regulative rules define violation conditions and sanctions. Such rules are 
enforced by an abstract entity, called a normative system. Crucially, trustor agents do not 
only have a profile of the trustee, but also a profile of the normative system that enforces 
the control mechanisms. The idea is depicted in Figure 1. Party trust is only based on the 
expectations of the trustor about the trustee. These expectations can be based on 
additional background information, such as personal acquaintance or shared cultural 
values. In the figure, it is represented by the vertical interaction between trustor and 
trustee. Control trust is more complex. It is based on expectations of the interaction 
between trustor and trustee, given the interaction of trustee with a normative system.  
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Figure 1: Recursive modeling of trustor, trustee and normative system 
 
Obviously, the simulations we run are largely based on assumptions. Often these 
assumption are derived from specific knowledge of the case. Technically, they are stored 
in a model M. For example, model MLC contains specific assumptions about the Letter of 
Credit procedure.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. To illustrate the approach we discuss the 
Letter of Credit trade procedure in section 2. In section 3 we define normative multiagent 
systems, as well as constitutive and regulative rules. In section 4 we analyze the Letter of 
Credit procedure in a normative multiagent system.  
2.  Letter of Credit 
Consider the well known documentary credit procedure of a Letter of Credit (Bons 1997, 
Lee 2000, Kartseva, Gordijn, and Tan 2004). Suppose we have a potential transaction 
between a customer and a supplier, which is located in a remote and unfamiliar part of the 
world. Hence there are no common conventions or trade procedures. In such 
circumstances a lack of trust is warranted. The supplier does not want to ship the goods 
without first receiving payment, but the customer does not want to pay before the goods 
have been shipped. To solve this deadlock situation banks introduced the Letter of Credit 
procedure (LC). A Letter of Credit is an agreement that the bank of the customer, called 
the issuing bank, will arrange a credit to guarantee payment as soon as the supplier can 
prove that the goods have been shipped. The supplier can prove this by presenting the 
shipping documents, such as a Bill of Lading, to his own bank, the corresponding bank. 
The shipping documents are issued by the carrier, as soon as the goods have in fact been 
shipped. The corresponding bank transfers the shipping documents to the issuing bank, 
which only delivers the shipping documents to the customer after payment. With the 
shipping documents the customer can then reclaim the goods from the carrier.  
A possible way of modeling the procedure is depicted in Figure 2, adapted from    ( Lee 
2000). It indicates the order in which documents must be exchanged, which provides 
information about the dependencies among actions: which actions will occur only 
provided some other actions have occurred. For example, the objective of step 4 is to let 
the supplier know that a credit has been secured, and that he can safely start shipping the 
goods. Similarly, the objective of the shipping documents, is to provide evidence that the 
goods have been transferred.  




Figure 2: Interaction Diagram of the Letter of Credit Procedure 
 
By means of the Letter of Credit procedure the original lack of trust between customer 
and supplier is replaced by a professional banking relationship between the issuing bank 
and the corresponding bank. The banks provide a service, a credit procedure, which is 
paid for by a fee. The fee must cover the handling costs and the insurance costs against 
the risk that the credit will not be redeemed. The professional banking relationship is 
much more trustworthy than the original transaction relationship, for a number of reasons.  
First, documentary credit procedures generally conform to the guidelines of the 
International Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, shipping documents have an evidentiary 
effect, guaranteed by the United Nations. Therefore, in case of a legal conflict, no party 
can claim not to have known about this evidentiary effect.  
Second, trading banks tend to have long term relationships. The success of these 
relationships is dependent on their reputation. In case a customer has a dispute with a 
bank over a Letter of Credit procedure, it might start a legal case, possibly damaging the 
reputation of the bank.  
Third, banks are regulated by their respective Central Banks. That means that, at least 
locally, banks can act as an institution that enforces adherence to the rules. 
3. Normative Multiagent Systems 
We present the basic idea of normative multiagent systems here. For a more technical 
exposition, we refer to Boella and van der Torre (2004). 
3.1 Beliefs and Goals 
Each agent has a profile of the mental attitudes of other agents. A profile contains the 
beliefs (information) and goals (internal motivations). External motivations, such as 
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social norms or laws, can be represented in the form of obligations. Later we show how 
obligations are reduced to a combination of beliefs and goals.  
Mental attitudes are represented in a logical language, as sets of conditionals or 
production rules. This expresses the fact that mental attitudes are context dependent ( 
Hansson 1969), and that their application is conditional on certain constraints. So each 
attitude Bel, Goal, is represented by a set of rules of the form A → B, where both A and B 
are formulas, composed of facts by means of logical operators ∧  (and), ∨  (or), ¬  (not) and 
the constant T (always true). Here A represents the conditions under which the facts 
represented by B may be inferred by the agent. Moreover, B may contain special decision 
variables, actions, whicht will alter that state of the world. For simplicity, both facts and 
decision variables are represented by Boolean variables, being either true or false. The 
decision making process of an agent is represented by a forward reasoning loop, which 
runs roughly as follows.  
The agent receives input from observation, represented as a set of facts S. Alternatively, 
the agent may start with a set of initial goals, represented by a set of decision variables S. 
Now the agent tries to match each rule A → B against S. If A is contained in S, and the 
facts of B do not contradict a fact in S, the rule is applicable. However, there may be 
several rules applicable to S, from the same and from different mental attitudes, each with 
a different possible outcome. Using a priority order, the agent selects one rule   this is 
called conflict resolution    and applies it: the result B is now added to S. This process 
continues, until a stable set of facts is reached, to which no further additions can be made. 
Such a stable set, an extension, represents one of the possible outcomes of the decision 
making. The decision making behavior of an agent crucially depends on the way conflicts 
among the mental attitudes are resolved. Different priority orders may lead to different 
extensions, which represent sets of goals and hence lead to different behavior. For 
example, a selfish agent will prefer goals to social obligations; a social agent will let 
obligations take priority.  
Example 1. Buying and Budget   Suppose an agent is a compulsive collector. Whenever 
it finds a rare toy, it wants to buy it. Because of a tight budget, the agent made up its mind 
not to buy any more toys. Now suppose the agent finds another rare toy. What will 
happen?  
Belief:   rare_toy  
Goal 1:  rare_toy → buy_toy  
Goal 2:  ¬  buy_toy  
What happens depends on the relative strength of the agent's urge to buy the car (goal 1) 
and its resolution not to (goal 2). These relative strengths can be expressed by a priority 
ordering on rules. In general, belief rules outrank all other goal rules; otherwise the agent 
would suffer from wishful thinking. If the second goal rule would outrank the first goal 
rule, the agent will refrain from buying. Otherwise, it will buy despite its resolutions.  
Priority: Belief > Goal 1 > Goal 2  
Outcome: { rare_toy , buy_toy}  
The example demonstrates that an agent considers different possible goals. Roughly, 
there are two kinds of goals. Achievement goals are satisfied once some state of affairs 
has been realized. For example, to buy an object. Maintenance goals on the other hand, 
are only satisfied for as long as some state of affairs continues to hold, for example the 
goal to stay within budget.  
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3.2. Norms and Obligations 
Beliefs and goals are mental attitudes of individual agents. How about social norms? 
General norms produce obligations for each agent that has accepted the norm. We 
propose a reduction of obligations to goals of the normative system, where the normative 
system itself is seen as a separate agent. This may be summarized by the slogan "Your 
wish is my command". The reduction makes use of a violation predicate ( Anderson 
1958). Violation detection is separated from sanctioning. Sanctioning concerns the 
decision to sanction an agent in case a violation has been detected, and what sanction is 
most appropriate. To make sure that normative systems do not act arbitrarily, a number of 
conditions must be observed ( Boella and van der Torre 2004).  
Definition 1 (Regulative Norm) Agent a is obliged to bring about x in circumstances C, 
under sanction s, with respect to a normative system n in a given model M, written as M 
|= Obla,n(x, s | C), if and only if the following conditions hold.  
1. If agent n believes that C, then it has as a goal that x should be brought about.  
Goal of n: C → x  
2. If agent n believes that C and ¬x is the case, then it has the goal     Viol(¬x, a), 
i.e., to detect ¬x as a violation by agent a.  
Goal of n: C ∧ ¬ x → Viol(¬x, a)  
3. Agent n has as a goal that there are no violations. This is to prevent arbitrary 
violation detection.  
Goal of n: ¬Viol(¬x, a)  
4. If agent n believes C and detects Viol(a,¬x), then it has the goal to sanction agent 
a.  
Goal of n: C ∧ Viol(¬x, a) → s  
5. By itself, agent n does not have a goal to sanction. This is to prevent arbitrary 
sanctioning.  
Goal of n: ¬ s  
6. Agent a has the goal ¬ s. Without this condition, sanction s would not deter agent 
a from violating the obligation.  
Goal of a: ¬ s  
To illustrate the definitions, we will use an example of some aspects of the Letter of 
Credit procedure. A complete analysis follows in section 4.  
Example 2. Evidentiary documents    
The model MLC is constructed as follows. We use Boolean variables `LC', 
`shipping_docs', `transfer_goods', `fraud', and `law_suit' to represent the facts of 
operating in the context of a Letter of Credit procedure, presenting the shipping 
documents, having transferred the goods from the custody of the supplier to the carrier, 
committing fraud, and starting a law suit, respectively. Variable a ranges over the 
relevant agents: customer (c), issuing bank (ib), corresponding bank (cb), supplier (s) and 
carrier (ca). We use un to denote the United nations: the institution that defines the 
meaning of shipping documents. We use n to denote the normative agent that is able to 
enforce a norm. Once a letter of Credit procedure has been established, this role is usually 
taken by the issuing bank. Because the issuing bank has long term trading relationships 
with many parties involved, it can come up with a credible sanction for each violation. In 
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the example, let us suppose that the sanction will be a lengthy law suit, with possible 
additional repercussions for reputation. We have an obligation to respect the meaning of 
the shipping documents, against a penalty of a lengthy law suit.  
MLC |= Obla,n(¬ fraud, law_suit | LC ), if and only if:  
1. Goal of n: LC → ¬ fraud  
2. Goal of n: LC ∧  fraud →Viol(fraud, a)  
3. Goal of n: ¬Viol(fraud, a)  
4. Goal of n: LC ∧  Viol(fraud, a) → law_suit  
5. Goal of n: ¬  law_suit  
6. Goal of a: ¬  law_suit  
Without the obligation, committing fraud would be desirable. For example, for a carrier it 
is profitable to issue fake shipping documents. Moreover, everybody knows we are 
operating in the context of a Letter of Credit procedure.  
7. Goal of a: shipping docs ∧ ¬ transfer_goods  
8. Belief of a, n: LC 
 
3.3 Constitutive Norms 
A normative system defines when institutional facts hold by constitutive norms. In 
general, there are two kinds of norms. Constitutive norms generate or constitute the 
institutional context, by means of establishing institutional facts (Searle 1995). For 
example, the rules of chess constitute the game by defining legal moves and positions. 
Regulative norms, by contrast, restrict the behavior of agents through obligations and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
A constitutive norm applies only under certain circumstances and is intimately linked to 
an institution. This institution can be a (legal) person or an abstract entity such as a 
community of users. Whether a rule applies depends on the jurisdiction of the institution. 
Thus constitutive rules are of the form "x counts as y under circumstances C in institution 
i". Several logical representations of counts-as rules have been studied, e.g., ( Jones and 
Sergot 1996). Counts-as rules associate one type of event or fact with another type of 
event or fact.  
In our NMAS model constitutive norms are modeled as belief rules of the institution. 
Moreover, having the rule is imperative for all agents that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
institution.  
Definition 2 (Constitutive norm) Event or fact x counts as event or fact y under 
circumstances C, to all agents a that fall under the jurisdiction of i in a given model M, 
written M |= Counts_asa,i(x, y | C), if and only if:  
1. Belief of a,i: C ∧ x → y  
2. If x results from an action, the agent executing the action must play a role in 
institution i.  
There is one relevant constitutive rule in our example.  
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      MLC |= Counts_asa,un((shipping docs∧ ¬ transfer_goods),fraud|LC),  
      i.e., Belief of un,a: LC ∧  shipping_docs ∧ ¬ transfer_goods → fraud  
3.4 Recursive Modeling 
Now we apply recursive modeling. Suppose agent a operates in the context of a Letter of 
Credit procedure, has a goal to cheat, and a goal to avoid law suits. So we get an initial 
extension of the form {LC, fraud, ¬  law_suit}. Because the consequences of these 
potential goals are to a large part controlled by the other party, agent a will try and predict 
the decisions of agent n. A set of rules to predict another agent's decisions is called a 
profile. Crucially, profiles contain rules that are affected by the actions of the agent itself. 
That is why this process is called recursive modeling. However, for most applications no 
infinite recursion is needed; recursive models up to three levels of embedding are usually 
quite sufficient. Here we only need one level of embedding.  
First  a compares rule 2 with rule 3. Which of these will get priority depends on a's 
profile of n. Lets assume that a believes that rule 2 outranks 3. That will produce an 
extension {LC, fraud, Viol(fraud, a), ¬  law_suit}. Second, a compares rule 4 and 5. If a 
expects n not to sanction, for example because of prohibitive costs of lawyers, a will form 
the goal to cheat. But if a expects n to act on detected fraud, this will produce an 
extension { LC, fraud, Viol(fraud, a), law_suit, ¬  law_suit }, which contains a 
contradiction. This conflict must be resolved by a's own priority order. In case the penalty 
outweighs the expected profits, the agent will not form a goal to commit fraud: { LC, ¬  
law_suit }.  
The example shows that an obligation only works when two conditions are met. First, the 
sanction must outweigh the benefits of a violation.  
(Goal of a: ¬  law_suit) > (Goal of a: fraud)  
Second, the expected relative priorities of being detected and sanctioned, must be 
sufficiently high.  
Profile of a:  
Goal of n: LC ∧  fraud → Viol(fraud, a)  >  Goal of n: ¬Viol(fraud,a) 
Goal of n: LC ∧ Viol(fraud, a) → law_suit  >  Goal of n: ¬ law_suit 
Violation detection and sanctioning can be delegated to specific agents, such as a police 
force. In the Letter of Credit case, violation detection is to a large extend the 
responsibility of the victims. For example, when a carrier has not transferred the goods to 
the customer, the customer can take the shipping documents, and file a complaint, i.e., 
notify the normative system of the violation.  
4. Letter of Credit in NMAS 
In this section we remodel the Letter of Credit procedure in normative multiagent 
systems, to indicate how control trust plays a role in transaction trust.  
We will model two sets of circumstances: one in which no control mechanism is in place, 
and one in which a Letter of Credit procedure has been established.  
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4.1 Without Letter of Credit 
We have the following scenario. Supplier s must decide to trust customer c in a 
transaction that consists of two actions: payment from c to s, and shipment from s to c, 
where price and details of delivery have been previously agreed. The sales contract would 
consist of two obligations:  
Obl c,n(payment, in_debt | shipping)  
Obl s,n(shipping, in_debt | payment) 
However, initially there is no credible normative system n that could enforce this 
contract. Parties are left to enforce their own contract, i.e. use external motivations like 
threats. But although parties can easily detect violations, they do not have the power to 
make a credible threat.  
Without documentary credits, there are still reasons for an agent to honor the contract. 
First, an agent could have the internal motivation that being in debt is morally wrong, and 
therefore undesirable. If this disposition were known, for example through shared cultural 
values, the agent can be trusted. Second, when the trade relationship is supposed to last 
for a longer period, a credible threat would be to end the trade relationship and ruin 
possible future transactions. In both cases adding such information would beg the 
question.  
So, in the absence of any further information, in the profile of the supplier, the customer 
has no incentive to pay after delivery. Similarly, the customer will expect the supplier not 
to deliver the goods after payment.  
Profile of s:  
(Goal of c: ¬  payment)   >  (Goal of c: ¬  in_debt) 
Profile of c: 
(Goal of s: ¬  shipping)   >  (Goal of s: ¬  in_debt)  
4.2 With Letter of Credit 
What we need is a mutual obligation in which non-compliance of one, irrevocably leads 
to failure for the other. Such a direct exchange of goods for money is only possible, when 
parties are physically present, and in possession of the valuables.  
Oblc,n(payment, ¬ shipping | shipping )  
Obls,n(shipping, ¬payment | payment). 
Because a simultaneous exchange is not possible in international trade, the mutual 
obligation must depend on evidentiary documents.  
Oblc,n(payment, ¬ shipping | evidence of shipping )  
Obls,n(shipping, ¬payment | evidence of credit). 
Such documents can be created through a Letter of Credit procedure. The rules of the 
procedure (figure 2) are constituted by the international trading conventions, encoded by 
the United Nations. The issuing bank acts as a normative system n to enforce adherence 
to these procedures. The issuing bank is a good candidate for enforcing the rules. First, its 
sanctions are credible. It is in a position to damage the other parties, for example by 
starting a law suit. Starting a lawsuit would not have been possible for the supplier for 
example, because it would involve a foreign legal system. Second, violation detection is 
relatively easy. Because of the evidentiary documents, typically the victim of fraud will 
be able to prove that a violation occurred.  
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So we must show that because of the dependencies specified in the constitutive rules of 
the Letter of Credit procedure, and the regulative enforcement by the issuing bank, the 
link between `evidence of shipping' and actual shipping, and the link between `evidence 
of credit' and actual payment, is strong enough to let both parties engage in the 
transaction (Figure 2).  
In other words, we must show that, in the profile of the supplier,  
1. the corresponding bank has an incentive to pay, upon receiving the shipping 
documents (step 7-8), and consequently  
2. the carrier will have an incentive to deliver the shipping documents, in return for 
the goods (step 4-6).  
Similarly, we must show that, in the profile of the customer,  
1. the carrier has an incentive to transport the goods and deliver them to the 
customer, in return for the shipping documents (step 14-15), and hence  
2. the corresponding bank and the issuing bank have incentives to transfer the 
shipping documents from the supplier to the customer, in return for their 
respective payments (steps 9-10,12-13). 
For lack of space, we can only sketch two of these requirements. The other steps are 
analogous.  
Step 7-8   According to the supplier, why should the corresponding bank pay? First, not 
paying would count as violation for the corresponding bank at this stage of the Letter of 
Credit procedure. It would risk a law suit. Second, it does not have much reason to 
withhold payment, since earlier it received credit from the issuing bank (step 3). And 
third, it needs the shipping documents, in order to get payment (step 9-10). Because the 
supplier will not hand over the shipping documents, there is a direct motivation for 
complying. Only the first suggestion is worked out in detail. It is a special case of 
example 2.  
Profile of s: 
Oblcb,ib(payment, law_suit) | LC ∧  shipping_docs )  
As we analyzed, this requires the following conditions:  
Profile of s:  
(Goal of cb: ¬  transfer_goods) < (Goal of cb: ¬ law_suit))  
(Goal of ib: LC ∧  shipping_docs ∧ ¬  payment → Viol(fraud, cb))   
   >  (Goal of ib: ¬Viol(fraud, cb))  
(Goal of ib: LC ∧  Viol(fraud, cb) → law_suit)        
>  (Goal of ib: ¬  law_suit)  
Step 14-15   Again, this is a special case of example 2. note that the carrier must already 
be in possession of the goods; otherwise the arrival notification (step 11) must have been 
false. When the goods are not handed over, the customer has a right to redress: he could 
notify the issuing bank (ib) that the carrier violated the Letter of Credit procedure. In that 
case, the carrier risks a law suit.  
Profile of c: 
Oblca,ib(transfer_goods, law_suit |LC ∧  shipping_docs∧ arrival_notif)  
As indicated, this will only work in case the following conditions are met.  
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Profile of c:  
Goal of ca: ¬  transfer_goods) < (Goal of ca: ¬  law_suit)  
(Goal of ib: LC ∧  shipping_docs ∧  arrival_notif ∧  ¬ goods → 
Viol(fraud,ca))    >  (Goal of ib: ¬Viol(fraud, ca))  
(Goal of ib: LC ∧ Viol(fraud, ca) → law_suit)    
 > (Goal of ib: ¬ law_suit)  
Note that customer c is in a position to assess these conditions, at least for ib. Typically, 
such expectations are based on aspects of party trust (personal experience, role, 
reputation).  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we studied transaction trust and its components party trust and control trust. 
Where party trust is based on expectations of parties about each other, control trust also 
involves expectations of parties about a normative system, and the way the other party 
will react to that normative system.  
The research questions can now be answered as follows.  
1. Control trust is generated by the existence of a control mechanism, and an 
institution that is perceived to be actively enforcing it. Control mechanisms may 
contain both evidentiary documents and obligations. Evidentiary documents can 
be accounted for by constitutive norms. Obligations can be reduced to a system 
of beliefs and goals of the normative system and the subject, according to the 
principle "Your wish is my command'. Our case study of the Letter of Credit 
procedure, showed that it makes sense to model control mechanisms as a 
combination of constitutive norms, that define institutional facts, and regulative 
norms, that enforce compliance to obligations through violation detection and 
sanctioning.  
2. Control trust will affect transaction trust by the fact that, according the trustor's 
profile, the trustee will let its decisions depend on the way a normative system is 
enforcing a control mechanism. That means that, according the trustor's profile, 
(1) the normative system must be willing and able to detect and sanction possible 
violations, and (2) the trustee must prefer avoiding a sanction to a violation. In 
our case study, we contrasted a situation without a Letter of Credit, in which the 
trustor would be most likely not to trust the trustee, with a situation in which a 
Letter of Credit procedure is established. In that case, the trustor is indeed likely 
to trust the trustee, provided conditions (1) and (2)  are met.  
Trust aspects of international trade procedures can be generalized to electronic 
commerce. Like international trade, electronic commerce often takes place between 
parties that are separated in time and space, do not know each other, and do not share a 
cultural background. Based on our initial analysis, we suggest the following steps for 
designing a control mechanism:  
1. Standards for evidentiary documents (constitutive norms) must be known and 
respected globally.  
2. Use of a standard must be enforced locally through regulative norms, by a 
normative system that has the institutional power to apply credible sanctions.  
3. Start with a mutual obligation, in which the sanction for both parties is simply 
non-compliance of the other party.  
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4. Set up a causal chain such that evidence of compliance can replace compliance 
itself, as an incentive for the other party to engage in a transaction.  
In further research we will investigate the mutual obligations that occur in a simultaneous 
exchange. These can be analyzed as a mutual threat or promise: I will comply only if you 
comply. It appears the structure of mutual threats or promises is simpler than that of the 
obligations analyzed in definition 1.  
References 
Anderson, A. (1958). A reduction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic. Mind, 67:100-
103.  
Blaze, M., J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy. (1996). Decentralized trust management. In IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, pages 164-173.  
Boella, G. and L. van der Torre. (2004). Regulative and constitutive norms in normative 
multiagent systems. In Procs. of 9th International Conference on the Principles 
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 255-265.  
Boella, G., J. Hulstijn, and L. van der Torre. (2005). Virtual organizations as normative 
multiagent systems. In Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'05), volume 7, page 192c.  
Bons, R. W. H. (1997). Designing Trustworthy Trade Procedures for open Electronic 
Commerce. Ph.D. thesis, University of Rotterdam. Castelfranchi, C. and Y. Tan, 
editors. (2000). Trust and Deception in Virtual Societies. Kluwer.  
Hansson, B. (1969). An analysis of some deontic logics. Nôus, 3:373-398.  
Jones, A. and J. Carmo. (2002). Deontic logic and contrary-to-duties. In D. Gabbay, 
editor, Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Kluwer, pages 203–-279.  
Jones, A. and M. Sergot. (1996). A formal characterisation of institutionalised power. 
Journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logic, 3:427-443.  
Kartseva, V., J. Gordijn, and Y.-H. Tan. (2004). Analysing preventative and detective 
control mechanisms in international trade using value modelling. In Proceedings 
of the Sixth International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC'04), pages 
51-18. ACM Press.  
Lee, R. M. (2000). Documentary Petri Nets: A modeling representation ffor electronic 
trade procedures. In W. van der Aalst, editor, Business Proces Management, 
LNCS 1806. Springer Verlag, pages 359-375.  
Macy, M. W. and J. Skvoretz. (1998). The evolution of trust and cooperation between 
strangers: A computational model. American Sociological Review, 63:638-660.  
Mayer, R., J. Davis, and F. Schoorman. (1995). An integrative model of organizational 
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3):709-734.  
Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. The Free Press, New York.  
Tan, Y.-H. and W. Thoen. (2000). An outline of a trust model for electronic commerce. 
Applied Artificial Intelligence, 14(8):849-862.  
Tan, Y.-H. and W. Thoen. (2002). Formal aspects of a generic model of trust for 
electronic commerce. Decision Support Systems, 33(3):233 - 246.  
United Nations. (1980). United nations convention on international multimodal transport 
of goods. Technical report, UNCITRAL (Geneva, 24 May 1980) 
